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1. Introduction

I shall address a familiar, yet persistent, problem confronted by welfare-based moral theories. Welfare is often based on suspect attitudes. Many people's pleasure, happiness, or preference satisfaction, for example, are based on racist, sexist, envious, meddling, or malicious attitudes. Is welfare derived from such sources relevant to the determination of what is morally permissible? Almost everyone has at least some "suspect" attitudes, so to ignore welfare based on suspect attitudes is to ignore things that people actually care about. To take such welfare at face value, however, seems to give it too much of a role in determining what is permissible. The welfare that a sadist gains from torturing others, it seems, does not have the same status as the welfare that victims lose.

This problem has already been discussed by a number of authors.¹ Typically, however, authors take one of two extreme positions: they hold that all welfare should be taken at face value, or they hold that "suspect" welfare should be completely ignored. My contribution here is the following: First, I introduce the notion of unauthorized (suspect) welfare, of which welfare from meddling preferences, offensive tastes, expensive tastes, etc. are special cases. Second, I formulate four conditions of adequacy, applicable to any welfare-based theory, for dealing with unauthorized welfare. These conditions require that unauthorized welfare be "discounted" (play a restricted role) but not be completely ignored. Thus, I shall be exploring a position intermediate between taking "unauthorized" welfare at face value and simply ignoring it. Moreover, the four conditions jointly determine exactly how existing welfare-based theories need to be revised so as to be appropriately sensitive to unauthorized welfare.

The problem of suspect welfare is best known for the problems it raises for utilitarianism, but the problem arises for all welfare-based theories. Welfare is here understood as subjective well-being. Pleasure, happiness, and

preference satisfaction are each conceptions of welfare, but liberty, health, wealth, and skills are not. Welfare-based moral theories base permissibility at least partly on the extent to which welfare is promoted. Utilitarianism is the most well-known example of a welfare-based theory. Welfare egalitarianism (which requires that welfare be distributed as equally as possible), and maximin welfarism (which requires that the minimum welfare be maximized) are two other examples.²

The paper, it should be emphasized, is very exploratory. My goal is to stake out some unexplored terrain, and boldly to erect a theoretical foundation. That foundation will no doubt will be weak at a number of points - - and perhaps even completely unstable. But I hope that it will at least provide the basis for future construction.

2. THE PROBLEM ILLUSTRATED

The problem of unauthorized welfare arises for all welfare-based theories. Because utilitarianism is the best known welfare-based theory, we shall focus on how the problem arises for it. More specifically, we shall focus on the version of utilitarianism that judges an act permissible just in case it produces at least as much total welfare as any alternative. For the sake of illustration, we shall therefore assume that utility is cardinally measurable, interpersonally comparable, and that everyone's utility is specified on the same scale. The problem of unauthorized welfare, however, in no way depends on these assumptions. We need them only to be able to use utilitarianism as an example.

In this section I shall make free intuitive use of the following notions: A person's full utility function represents all sources of welfare. Some sources of welfare (e.g., maliciousness) may be unauthorized (or suspect). A person's reconstructed utility function represents his/her welfare from only authorized sources. In the next section I shall clarify these notions.

Consider, then, the following situation in which Robert has the choice

of playing disco or opera music -- but not both -- for Maria.

<u>Option</u>	<u>Reconstructed Welfare</u>			<u>Full Welfare</u>		
	<u>Robert</u>	<u>Maria</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Robert</u>	<u>Maria</u>	<u>Total</u>
Disco	60	60	120	60	60	120
Opera	60	0	60	120	0	120

Example 1

Here, let us suppose, that: (1) Maria likes disco, but not opera, music, and Robert likes each equally well; and (2) Robert (twisted as he is) derives unauthorized utility from Maria's listening to music (such as opera) that she does not like (and so his reconstructed welfare excludes the unauthorized part of his full welfare); and (3) Maria derives no unauthorized utility (and so her reconstructed welfare is simply her full welfare).

Taking people's full utility functions at face value (and assuming that Robert and Maria are the only members of society) utilitarianism would judge permissible both Disco and Opera, since both maximize full social utility. But why should Opera be judged permissible? Opera yields as much social utility as Disco only if one counts Robert's unauthorized utility from Maria's auditory frustration. In terms of reconstructed utility Robert gets as much from Disco as from Opera, and Maria gets more. So, since Disco is the only option that would be judged permissible on the basis of reconstructed utility functions, it seems inappropriate to judge Opera permissible. Why should it be permissible to deprive Maria of authorized utility simply because Robert has an unauthorized utility function?

The above example suggests, and we shall assume, that a plausible welfare-based theory cannot be based solely on the promotion of full welfare. At least sometimes, the utility generated by unauthorized utility functions should be somehow discounted.³ This is a controversial assumption, but since it is one of the starting points for our investigation, I shall not defend it here. The above example is intended to motivate -- not fully defend -- the assumed insufficiency of full welfare promotion for permissibility.

One might jump to the conclusion that unauthorized utility should simply be ignored, that permissibility should be determined solely on the basis of suitable authorized utility functions.⁴ After all, if the welfare is unauthorized, why should it be promoted? Completely ignoring unauthorized welfare, however, would be a mistake. The promotion of unauthorized welfare is sometimes relevant. For consider the following choice situation:

<u>Option</u>	<u>Reconstructed Welfare</u>			<u>Full Welfare</u>		
	<u>Robert</u>	<u>Maria</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Robert</u>	<u>Maria</u>	<u>Total</u>
Disco	60	60	120	60	60	120
Opera	60	0	60	120	70	190

Example 2

Here the situation is exactly the same as in the first example --except that Maria's full utility function is different. Unlike the case in Example 1, Maria here derives welfare -- not only from the music she hears, but also from her the satisfaction of her meddling desire that Robert listen to opera. More specifically, Maria derives full welfare both from her own auditory sensations (which favor Disco) and from her unauthorized desire that Robert listen to Opera. (That this desire is unauthorized is simply being assumed for the sake of illustration.) On balance, she derives more full welfare from Opera.

We are considering (but only to reject) the suggestion that unauthorized welfare always be ignored, that is, that permissibility be determined solely on the basis of reconstructed welfare. The above example suggests that this is not plausible. For based on reconstructed welfare (e.g., that derived from the person's own auditory sensations), Disco yields more social welfare than Opera (120 vs 60). And so, if only reconstructed welfare counts, utilitarianism judges Disco, but not Opera, permissible. Intuitively, however, it should be the opposite. Opera, but not Disco, should be judged permissible by utilitarianism. For in terms of their full welfare both Robert and Maria are better off with Opera. Unauthorized welfare may be suspect, but at least in cases where it can be appropriately (as judged by a given moral theory) promoted at no cost (in terms of full welfare) to anyone, its promotion is relevant to the determination of what is permissible.⁵

The claim that unauthorized welfare should at least sometimes be taken into account and promoted is admittedly controversial.⁶ Some people will deny, for example that welfare based on racist, sexist, envious, and/or malicious attitudes should ever be taken into account. That unauthorized welfare should be taken into account is one of the starting assumptions for this paper, and so I will not defend the claim here. The above example is enough, I hope, to at least motivate it.

Example 1 suggests, and we shall assume, that at least sometimes unauthorized welfare should not be promoted. Example 2 suggests, and we shall assume, that at least sometimes unauthorized welfare should be promoted. We shall assume, that is, a position intermediate between taking unauthorized welfare at face value and always ignoring it. The deep justification for this position might involve an appeal to respect for persons. Respecting persons, it could be argued, involves not only taking into account whatever matters to them (full welfare), but also ensuring that their interests are not sacrificed for the promotion of unreasonable interests of others (unauthorized welfare).⁷ But that's a topic for another paper.

Our task, then, is to determine how unauthorized welfare should be taken into consideration without taking it at face value. Those who reject one of the above two assumptions may find little of interest in what follows.

3. UNAUTHORIZED WELFARE AND RECONSTRUCTED UTILITY FUNCTIONS

Before illustrating more concretely the problem of unauthorized welfare, we need to clarify the notion of unauthorized welfare.

A person's welfare disposition (e.g., preference relation or utility function) ranks alternatives in terms of his/her welfare: for any two alternatives the welfare disposition determines that one is superior, inferior, equivalent, or incomparable to the other. We shall assume that these welfare dispositions are orderings (i.e., not only transitive, but also complete) and that they satisfy a standard continuity requirement. Consequently, we can assume that a person's welfare disposition is representable by a class of utility functions that assign utility values in the same order.⁸ Throughout, 'welfare' and 'utility' will be used interchangeably.

A person's full utility function (in this context) represents the full, unpurified welfare values of the options to that person. Welfare from suspect sources (envy, malice, or whatever) is fully reflected in the full utility function of a person.⁹ A person's full utility function is, let us say,

authorized, according to a given theory, just in case it conforms to the theory's welfare authorization standard (hereafter simply: welfare standard). Welfare standards, that is, specify which utility functions are authorized.

Without loss of generality we can deem every welfare-based theory to have a welfare standard. For we can allow theories to have trivial welfare standards, i.e., standards that authorize all utility functions. For such theories there will be no unauthorized utility functions. For other theories, however, the welfare standard might authorize only some utility functions -- for example, those based on non-malicious, non-envious, non-racist, and/or non-sexist attitudes.

Welfare standards come in all shapes and forms. They can, for example, be objective or subjective. A welfare standard that authorizes a utility function if and only if it is linear in money is an example of an objective welfare standard: the class of utility functions it authorizes is independent of the agent's welfare disposition (e.g., whether money is good for his/her welfare). A welfare standard that authorizes a utility function if and only if represents the agent's self-regarding preferences is an example of a subjective welfare standard, in that the class of utility functions it authorizes is dependent on the agent's welfare disposition (namely, the self-regarding part of it).

Welfare standards vary in how restrictive they are. At one extreme are trivial welfare standards that authorize everything. At the other extreme are welfare standards that authorize exactly one utility function. In between are welfare standards that authorize some non-exhaustive, multi-membered family of utility functions.

Welfare standards may, but need not, be sensitive to facts about why an individual has the welfare disposition that he/she does. For example, a welfare standard might authorize a utility function that is extremely sensitive to "small" differences in resource allocations, if the hypersensitivity is the result of some genetic trait over which the agent has little control, but not

if the hypersensitivity is the result of the agent's consciously developing this sensitivity.

In what follows, we shall assume that any plausible welfare-based theory will have a non-trivial welfare standard, and thus count at least some utility functions (e.g., those based on malicious attitudes) as unauthorized. This assumption does not commit us to treating unauthorized utility functions any differently from authorized functions. It merely commits us to the possibility of drawing a distinction. Nonetheless, the assumption is controversial, but since it is one of the starting points for the present project, I shall not defend it here.

We shall further assume that each welfare-based theory specifies a uniquely appropriate way of "cleaning up and repairing" -- so as to make authorized -- a person's utility function if it is not authorized. Let us, then, understand a person's reconstructed utility function to be: (a) his/her full utility function, if it is authorized, and otherwise (b) a cleaned up and repaired (so as to be authorized) version of his/her full utility function. Metaphorically, reconstructed utility functions come from full utility functions by "taking them apart", "cleaning them up", "replacing old parts with new ones" as necessary, and "putting them back together".

The assumption that for each person there is an appropriately unique reconstructed utility function is controversial. It is not obvious that there is a fact of the matter concerning what people's utility functions are like when the unauthorized aspects (e.g., malice) are "subtracted off" and missing aspects (needed for authorization) are "added on". The unauthorized aspects may not be neatly separable from the authorized aspects. For a given person there may be many authorized utility functions, and there may be no fact of the matter concerning which one is "the" cleaned-up and repaired version of his/her full utility function. Nonetheless, we shall start by assuming the existence of appropriately unique reconstructed utility functions. I will briefly defend this assumption in Section 0.

4. FOUR CONDITIONS OF ADEQUACY

How exactly should unauthorized welfare be dealt with? I shall now formulate four conditions of adequacy, which jointly determine exactly how unauthorized welfare should be dealt with. In this section I will merely present -- not defend -- the ideas. In the next section I will take up some objections.

Here is a simple idea: Taking unauthorized welfare into account should not adversely affect anyone. More specifically, no option judged permissible should make anyone less well off (in terms of full welfare) than every option that would be judged permissible on the basis of reconstructed welfare. The basic idea is that no one should be disadvantaged (in terms of full welfare) just because someone has an unauthorized utility function.

More precisely, the idea is this:

NO WORSENING: If an option makes at least one person less well off (in terms of full welfare) than does every option that would be judged permissible on the basis of people's reconstructed utility functions, then the option should be judged impermissible.

Applied to utilitarianism, the idea becomes:

UTILITARIAN NO WORSENING: If an option makes at least one person less well off (in terms of full welfare) than does every option that would maximize social reconstructed welfare, then the option should be judged impermissible.

This idea places a constraint on how unauthorized welfare may be taken into account, and thus entails our starting assumption that at least sometimes unauthorized welfare should be discounted. But the starting assumption does not entail the idea, and so some defense is needed. I will do this in the next section.

To see how this condition works, let us apply it to the two examples of the previous section. Once again for the sake of illustration, we will use utilitarianism as our test case, and we shall continue to assume for concreteness that the welfare standard denies authorization to a person's full utility functions if it is sensitive to other people's auditory pleasures.

In Example 1 Utilitarian No Worsening requires that Opera be judged impermissible: On the basis of reconstructed welfare Disco, but not Opera, would be judged permissible, since Disco (with 60 utiles for each Robert and Maria) produces more total welfare than Opera (with 60 utiles for Robert and 0 for Maria). Since in terms of full welfare Maria is less well off with Opera than with Disco (0 vs 60), Utilitarian No Worsening requires that Opera be judged impermissible. This gives, I claim, the intuitively correct judgement, since it seems impermissible to disadvantage Maria (by choosing Opera rather than Disco) simply because Robert has an unauthorized full utility function (that is negatively sensitive to Maria's auditory pleasures). No Worsening correctly prohibits using the utility gain from Robert's unauthorized welfare to offset the utility loss from Maria's authorized welfare.

In Example 2 the reconstructed utility numbers are the same, and so here too Disco would be judged permissible by utilitarianism on the basis of reconstructed utility. However, in this case Maria's full utility is (we are assuming for the illustration) unauthorized because it is sensitive to what Robert music Robert listens to. In particular, even though Maria gets less reconstructed welfare from Opera (she gets less auditory pleasure), she gets more full welfare from it (since the auditory loss is more than compensated for by the satisfaction of having Robert listen to opera). So, in this case Utilitarian No Worsening has no bite (does not require that anything be judged impermissible). This is because Opera makes Maria and Robert each at least as well off (in terms of full welfare) as he/she would be under Disco (which is what would be judged permissible on the basis of reconstructed welfare).

Utilitarian No Worsening is compatible with, but does not require, Disco

(which makes both Robert and Maria less well off) being judged impermissible in Example 2. Intuitively, however, it seems that utilitarianism should judge Disco impermissible. For Opera yields more full welfare for each of Robert and Maria. Although some of that welfare is unauthorized, no one is suffering -- indeed, everyone is benefiting -- from its promotion. In contrast to Example 1, no one involved would have grounds for complaining about maximizing full social welfare. In such cases it seems that utilitarianism should judge impermissible options that fail to maximize full social welfare.

In order to formulate concisely a condition of adequacy reflecting the above intuition, let us call the set of options that No Worsening allows to be judged permissible the restricted option set. That is:

RESTRICTED OPTION SET: the set of options that satisfy No Worsening, i.e., that make everyone at least as well off (in terms of full welfare) as does at least one option that would be judged permissible on the basis of people's reconstructed utility functions.

The restricted option set consists of (a) all those options that would be judged permissible on the basis of reconstructed welfare plus (b) all the options that disadvantage no one (in terms of full welfare) relative to those satisfying clause (a). In both Example 1 and Example 2 Disco is in the utilitarian restricted option set because it maximizes social reconstructed welfare. In Example 1 Opera is not in the utilitarian restricted option set, because it gives Maria less full welfare than Disco (which is the only option that maximizes full social welfare). In Example 2 Opera is in the utilitarian restricted option set, because it gives both Maria and Robert at least as much full welfare as Disco.

Our second condition, then is:

RESTRICTED IMPERMISSIBILITY: If there is at least one option in the restricted

option set that would be judged permissible on the basis of people's full utility functions, then any option that would be judged impermissible on the basis of people's full utility functions, should be judged impermissible.

Applied to utilitarianism this becomes:

UTILITARIAN RESTRICTED IMPERMISSIBILITY: If there is at least one option in the utilitarian restricted option set (i.e., the set of options which each person at least as much full welfare as does at least one option that maximizes reconstructed welfare) that maximizes full social welfare, then any option that does not maximize full social welfare should be judged impermissible.

In Example 2, Opera is in the utilitarian restricted option set, and would be judged permissible on the basis of people's full utility functions. Consequently, since Disco would not be judged permissible on the basis of people's full utility functions (although it is in the restricted option set), Restricted Impermissibility requires that Disco be judged impermissible.

In Example 1 both Disco and Opera would be judged permissible on the basis of full utility functions. Consequently, Restricted Impermissibility has no implications in Example 1.

So far we have No Worsening, which requires that options not in the restricted option set be judged impermissible, and Restricted Impermissibility, which requires that options that would be judged impermissible on the basis of people's full utility functions be judged impermissible, if at least one option in the restricted option set would be judged permissible on the basis of people's full utility functions. Neither of these conditions requires that any option be judged permissible. An obvious further condition is:

RESTRICTED PERMISSIBILITY: All options in the restricted option set that would be judged permissible on the basis of people's full utility functions should be

judged permissible.

Applied to utilitarianism, this becomes:

UTILITARIAN RESTRICTED PERMISSIBILITY: All options in the utilitarian restricted option set that maximize full social welfare should be judged permissible.

In Example 1 this condition requires that Disco be judged permissible by utilitarianism (since it satisfies No Worsening and maximizes full social welfare). In Example 2 this condition requires that Opera be judged permissible by utilitarianism (since it satisfies No Worsening and maximizes full social welfare).

These three conditions determine exactly which options should be judged permissible in the cases where at least one option in the restricted option set would be judged permissible on the basis of people's full utility functions. In such cases an option should be judged permissible if and only if it would be judged permissible on the basis of people's full utility and it is in the restricted option set. The three conditions do not, however, determine what should be judged permissible in cases where no option in the restricted option set would be judged permissible on the basis of people's full utility functions. Consider, for example, the following choice situation:

<u>Option</u>	<u>Reconstructed Welfare</u>			<u>Full Welfare</u>		
	<u>Robert</u>	<u>Maria</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Robert</u>	<u>Maria</u>	<u>Total</u>
Disco	60	60	120	60	60	120
Opera	60	0	60	120	70	190
Jazz	0	0	0	50	150	200

Example 3

This case is exactly like that of Example 2 except that a third option, Jazz has been added. Neither Robert nor Maria likes the sound of jazz, but Robert obtains some unauthorized welfare from Maria's auditory frustration, and Maria gets a significant amount of unauthorized welfare from Robert's listening to jazz (which far outweighs her welfare loss from the deprived auditory pleasure). (Robert is somewhat malicious, and Maria is very meddlesome.)

Here the utilitarian restricted option set is {Disco, Opera} (since Disco maximizes reconstructed social utility, and Opera gives no one less full welfare than Disco). Jazz is not in the utilitarian restricted option set, since it makes Robert less well off than all the options that would be judged permissible on the basis of reconstructed welfare (namely: Disco). However, Jazz does maximize full social welfare. So, in contrast with the earlier examples, no option in the restricted option set maximizes full social welfare.

What should a revised utilitarianism judge permissible in such a case?

A plausible approach -- but one which is admittedly much more controversial than the first three conditions -- would be to judge options in the restricted option set permissible if and only if they maximize full social utility relative to the restricted option set. That is, options that are not in the restricted option set should simply be ignored in determining which option maximizes full social utility.

The fourth condition, then, is:

UTILITARIAN CONFLICT RESOLUTION: If no option in the utilitarian restricted option set maximizes full social welfare relative to the full option set, then options in the restricted option set should be judged permissible if and only if they maximize full social welfare -- but considering only the restricted option set.

Generalizing this approach to all theories, we get:

CONFLICT RESOLUTION: If no options in the restricted option set would be judged permissible on the basis of people's full utility functions, then options in the restricted option set should be judged permissible if and only if they would be judged permissible on the basis of people's full utility functions but considering only the restricted option set.

This condition does not apply to Examples 1 and 2, since its antecedent clause is not satisfied in those examples (in those examples some option in the restricted option set also maximized full social welfare). In Example 3 No Worsening requires that Jazz be judged impermissible (since it gives Robert less full welfare than Disco). The utilitarian restricted option set is thus {Disco, Opera}. Conflict Resolution requires that Opera, but not Disco, be judged permissible, since relative to the restricted option set Opera (with a full social utility of 190), but not Disco (with a full social utility of 120), maximizes full social welfare.

These four conditions determine exactly how a welfare-based moral theory should be modified so as to be suitably sensitive to both full and reconstructed welfare. If no one has an unauthorized utility function, then Conflict Resolution is inapplicable (since all options that would be judged permissible on the basis of people's full utility functions will be in the restricted option set), and the first three conditions determine that permissibility should be determined in the "traditional" way using only people's full utility functions. If, however, someone has an unauthorized utility function, the four conditions may require different judgements of permissibility from those of the traditional version of the theory.

No Worsening requires a certain sensitivity to people's reconstructed utility functions (namely that no option should be judged permissible that makes anyone worse off than he/she would be under all the options that would be judged permissible on the basis of people's reconstructed utility functions). It entails in particular that being judged permissible on the basis of people's

full utility functions should not be sufficient for being judged permissible.¹⁰

The remaining three conditions require a certain sensitivity to people's full utility functions. In particular, Restricted Permissibility/Impermissibility requires that under certain conditions being judged permissible/impermissible on the basis of people's full utility functions should be sufficient/necessary for permissibility. These two conditions entail that being judged permissible on the basis of people's reconstructed utility functions should be neither necessary nor sufficient for being judged permissible.

In formulating the conditions I treated separately (a) the case where some option that satisfies No Worsening would be judged permissible on the basis of full welfare (governed by Restricted Permissibility and Restricted Impermissibility), and (b) the case where no option that satisfies No Worsening would be judged permissible on the basis of full welfare (governed by Conflict Resolution). This separation was done to facilitate discussion with critics who agree with the conditions governing one case, but not with the conditions governing the other. The separation, however, makes things look more complicated than they are. For the conjunction Restricted Permissibility, Restricted Impermissibility, and Conflict Resolution is the following condition:

RESTRICTED FULL WELFARE: Options in the restricted option set should be judged permissible if and only if relative to the restricted option set they would be judged permissible on the basis of people's full utility functions.

Applied to utilitarianism this becomes:

UTILITARIAN RESTRICTED FULL WELFARE: Options in the utilitarian restricted option set should be judged permissible if and only if relative to the restricted option set they maximize full social utility.

No Worsening requires that options not in the restricted option set be judged impermissible. Restricted Full Welfare requires that options in the restricted option set be judged on the basis of full welfare (not reconstructed welfare) but considering only the options in the restricted option set. Focussing on Restricted Full Welfare -- rather than the original three underlying conditions -- makes the content of the three conditions easier to grasp. If Restricted Full Welfare is contested, however, it will be useful to focus on the underlying three conditions.

The four (or two) conditions uniquely determine a revision procedure, i.e., a procedure for revising any given welfare-based theory so as to be appropriately sensitive to both full and reconstructed welfare. To ensure that it is clear what the conditions and the required revision procedure are, let us consider another example.

Option	<u>Reconstructed Welfare</u>				<u>Full Welfare</u>			
	<u>Robert</u>	<u>Maria</u>	<u>Sue</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Robert</u>	<u>Maria</u>	<u>Sue</u>	<u>Total</u>
Disco	50	60	50	160	50	60	60	170
Opera	51	50	80	181	51	50	50	151
Jazz	52	55	50	157	52	55	55	162
Blues	53	45	83	181	53	45	57	155

Example 4

Here the utilitarian restricted option set is {Opera, Jazz, Blues}. Opera and Blues are in the restricted option set because each maximizes reconstructed social welfare (181). Jazz is in the option set because it gives each person at least as much full welfare as Opera. Based on people's full utility functions only Disco would be judged permissible. So this is a case where no option in the restricted option set would be judged permissible on the basis of people's full utility functions. The revision procedure (and Conflict Resolution in particular) thus requires that the traditional utilitarian

criterion be applied only to the restricted option set, and that yields the judgement that only Jazz is permissible. Disco is judged impermissible because it violates No Worsening (Robert is worse off under Disco than under Opera, and hence Disco is not in the restricted option set). Opera and Blues are judged impermissible because, although they satisfy No Worsening (and are thus in the restricted option set), Jazz also satisfies No Worsening, and Jazz produces more full social welfare.

Before defending the revision procedure, I want to consider another aspect of the problem of unauthorized welfare, and how the revision procedure can deal with it.

5. UNAUTHORIZED INTENSITY OF WELFARE

So far we have considered only cases of unauthorized order of welfare, i.e., cases where the order in which people's welfare dispositions rank things is unauthorized. These cases correspond roughly to what some authors have called 'the problem of offensive tastes'. We shall now consider the problem of unauthorized intensities of welfare, i.e., where differences in utility values for options are unauthorized (even if the corresponding order is authorized). These cases correspond to what some authors call 'the problem of expensive/cheap tastes'.

The most common problem of unauthorized intensity of welfare comes from utility monsters. Supersensitive utility monsters are individuals who care excessively intensely about the differences between alternatives (e.g., where eating an apple rather than an orange gives a person a million extra units of utility, but "normal" individuals would only get at most a few extra units of utility). Subsensitive utility monsters are individuals that care insufficiently intensely about the differences between alternatives (e.g., no matter what and how much resources a person is allocated his/her utility changes by at most one unit, but the utility of "normal" normal individuals would vary significantly).¹¹

Supersensitive utility monsters create problems for utilitarianism because social utility maximization requires that they be given almost all the resources (since they are very efficient at generating utility). Likewise subsensitive utility monsters create problems for welfare egalitarianism because welfare equalization requires that they be given almost all the resources (since they are very inefficient at generating utility).¹² Should "normal" people get very little resources and utility just because someone else is a utility monster? Intuitively it seems not. But why not? Perhaps if utility monsters are recognized as having unauthorized utility functions a rationale can be given for not taking the intensity of welfare of utility monsters at face value.

Consider, then, the following choice situation:

<u>Option</u>	<u>Reconstructed Welfare</u>			<u>Full Welfare</u>		
	<u>Robert</u>	<u>Maria</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Robert</u>	<u>Maria</u>	<u>Total</u>
Bach	50	60	110	50	600	650
Mozart	55	50	105	55	500	555
Beethoven	60	55	115	60	550	610

Example 5

Here, unlike the earlier examples, let us suppose that the full welfare for both Robert and Maria is based on only their own auditory pleasures, and that the order of the full welfare rankings is therefore authorized. We shall further suppose that in terms of the intensity of their welfare dispositions, Robert's intensity is authorized (music matters to him with an appropriate intensity), but Maria's intensity is unauthorized (music matters way too much to her: between Bach and Mozart there is a difference of 100 utiles on the given scale where there should only be 10). Maria is a supersensitive utility monster for music. (Less technically: she's a maniac about music.)

In this example Beethoven alone would be judged permissible by

utilitarianism on the basis of people's reconstructed utility functions (since $115 > 110 > 105$). Furthermore, it is the only option in the restricted option set (every other option makes at least one person less well off in terms of full welfare). So No Worsening requires (and the revision procedure for utilitarianism agrees) that all options other than Beethoven be judged impermissible. In particular, Bach is required to be judged impermissible -- even though it has the highest social utility based on people's full utility functions. This is plausible, I suggest, because Bach maximizes social utility only because of Maria's unauthorized intensity of welfare. It is impermissible to sacrifice Robert's authorized utility for Maria's unauthorized utility. Since the restricted option set is {Beethoven}, Conflict Resolution requires that Beethoven alone be judged permissible.

The above example presupposes, of course, that there are valid welfare standards that discriminate between appropriate and inappropriate welfare intensities. Some may find this more problematic than the presupposition of ordinal welfare standards. Note, however, that the proposed revision procedure (and the set of the four underlying conditions) does not presuppose the existence of welfare intensity standards. It is rather that, if there are such standards, then the revision procedure offers a plausible way of dealing with unauthorized intensity of welfare. If there are no standards for welfare intensity, then there are no utility monsters (their identification depends on welfare intensity standards), and the revision procedure has no applicability to such cases. It would, however, still be applicable to cases of unauthorized order of welfare.

In this section we have seen that the problem of utility monsters is simply a special case of the problem of unauthorized welfare -- namely the case where people have unauthorized intensities of welfare. The four conditions and the suggested revision procedure for welfare-based theories thus deal with utility monsters just as they deal with any unauthorized welfare. In order to deal adequately with utility monsters, welfare-based theories must invoke some

plausible condition limiting the role of unauthorized welfare. No Worsening is, I suggest, such a condition. But it's now time to defend this and other claims.

6. OBJECTIONS AND REPLIES

The project of this paper rests on four assumptions that I will not here defend: (1) that some welfare-based moral theory is adequate; (2) that an adequate welfare-based theory must recognize some welfare as unauthorized; (3) that unauthorized welfare should be taken into consideration; and (4) that unauthorized welfare should not be taken at face value (its role should be restricted). Examples 1 and 2 were intended to motivate (partially defend) the last three assumptions, and I will not undertake here a fuller defense. The focus of the project is rather to see what approach within the framework of the four assumptions is most plausible.

Although I will now undertake briefly to defend the conditions of adequacy formulated in Section 0, let me first acknowledge that I doubt very much that these conditions are exactly right. My main goal is to defend the general approach of having moral permissibility be sensitive both to full welfare and to reconstructed welfare. The four conditions of adequacy should thus be viewed only as first approximations.

a. The Inadequacy of Utilitarianism

Utilitarianism, it might be objected, is so fundamentally flawed that it is not worth worrying how to improve it. I agree! Utilitarianism is deeply flawed: It is too demanding, provides insufficient protection to individuals, is insensitive to the past, is insensitive to distributive considerations, and requires the doubtful presupposition that utility is interpersonally comparable.

But utilitarianism is not the only welfare-based theory. And each of the problems of utilitarianism can be avoided within the welfare-based approach.

(See, for example, Vallentyne 1988.) So, the rejection of utilitarianism does not entail the rejection of the welfare-based approach. The problem of unauthorized utility does, however, arise for all welfare theories. So it is worth seeing whether that problem can be adequately dealt with. Utilitarianism -- because of its familiarity -- was simply used as an example.

More generally, the four conditions are at best necessary -- not sufficient -- conditions of adequacy. By appropriate modification any welfare-based theory can be made to satisfy the four conditions. So, quite clearly, satisfying the conditions is not enough to be adequate. The claim is only that failure to satisfy the conditions (failing to be appropriately sensitive to both full and reconstructed welfare) entails inadequacy.

b. Reconstructed Utility Functions

Each of the four conditions of adequacy and the revision procedure refers to the restricted option set, and that set is determined by what would be judged permissible on the basis of reconstructed utility functions. Thus, each condition presupposes that (for any given scale) there is a unique reconstructed utility function for each person. This is a presupposition that needs defending.

To start, note that the presupposition is not that there is a privileged theory-independent manner of reconstructing utility functions. It is rather that each welfare-based theory can specify how to reconstruct unauthorized utility functions so as to make them authorized. The plausibility of a given reconstruction procedure (and any given welfare standard) is to be tested by the implications of the theory as a whole. So the only issue is whether it is possible to give a plausible specification as part of a theoretical framework.

Of course, whether it is possible to specify a plausible reconstruction procedure may depend on what conception of welfare, and what sorts of welfare standards, are used. It may be possible, for example, to specify a plausible reconstruction procedure for preference satisfaction, but not for pleasure. I

will not defend the claim that there are plausible reconstruction procedures for all conceptions of welfare. Nor will I attempt to show that any particular reconstruction procedure is highly plausible. All I will attempt to show is that it is not unreasonable to assume the existence of plausible reconstruction procedures for a number of conceptions of welfare.

The reconstruction procedure specified by a theory can be objective, in the sense of being insensitive to the full welfare disposition of the agent.¹³ For example, a theory could specify that the reconstructed utility of an option for a given person is equal to some measure of his/her resource (e.g., money) allocation, or to some measure of his/her allocation of primary goods (in Rawls' sense). Such reconstruction procedures are very radical in that they require in effect "throwing out all the old parts and putting in brand new ones". Nonetheless they are clearly possible (albeit limiting cases of) reconstruction procedures, and it is not wildly implausible to base a moral theory at least partly on the promotion of such reconstructed utility.¹⁴

Objective reconstruction procedures are completely insensitive to the full welfare disposition of individuals. At the other extreme are purely subjective reconstruction procedures, which "add no new parts", but which merely "clean up the old parts". Such procedures take full utility functions and merely "remove some of the dirt". An example of this is a procedure that somehow removes anti-social preferences and leaves everything else intact (or minimally modified, if necessary). Most welfare-based theorists assume that some such procedure is possible, and promising work has been done by M.J. Farrell and Robert Goodin in support of this view.¹⁵

Between objective and purely subjective reconstruction procedures are partially subjective ones. These are procedures that "replace some, but not all, of the old parts with new ones". An example is a procedure that takes a person's full interests, and assigns them objective weights (i.e., weights independent of the person's tastes) to produce a reconstructed utility function. Such an approach has been advocated by T.M. Scanlon (1975).

The point is that reconstruction procedures can be -- and most plausibly are -- theory-relative, and can take a wide variety of forms.¹⁶ Consequently, there is little reason a priori to suppose that no such procedure is plausible.

As a final point, note that reconstruction procedures (and welfare standards) can be sensitive to facts about the genesis of a person's utility function -- not merely to the content of the function. Thus, for example, an excessive concern for one's monetary superiority over others might not be altered in the reconstruction procedure, if it is due to no fault of the agent (e.g., due to biological factors or to very early childhood experiences), but might be altered, if it developed as the result of a conscious choice of the agent.¹⁷ The possibility of such genesis-sensitivity is a further reason for holding that plausible reconstruction procedures are possible.

The above considerations do not establish that plausible reconstruction procedures are possible for all welfare-based theories, but they are enough to show that the assumed existence of such procedures is not wildly implausible.

c. No Worsening

No Worsening requires that no option be judged permissible that makes someone less well off than all the options that would be judged permissible on the basis of people's reconstructed utility functions. Sometimes this requires that options be judged impermissible that would be judged permissible on the basis of people's full utility functions. (Examples 2-5 illustrate this point.) Is this plausible?

No Worsening says, in effect, that the full welfare of one person cannot be sacrificed (compared to what he/she would get on the basis of reconstructed utility functions) for benefits to others. No Worsening thus takes the separateness of persons seriously -- at least in the sense of holding people responsible for their full utility functions (since full utility is not taken at face value).

In a case in which there is only a small number of people each of whom

would get slightly more full utility from an option that No Worsening requires to be judged impermissible, No Worsening's requirement is quite plausible. For why should someone be made worse off (than he/she would be with any option judged permissible on the basis of reconstructed utility functions) simply to promote someone's unauthorized utility? An adequate solution to the problem of unauthorized welfare seems to require that we judge such sacrifices impermissible.

The problematic case is where there is a large number of people each of whom would get a very significant benefit from an option that No Worsening requires to be judged impermissible. Here No Worsening's required judgment of impermissibility may seem implausible. As applied to utilitarianism, for example, it has the result that a very large amount of full social utility has to be foregone in order to satisfy No Worsening -- even if the protected person would be made only slightly worse off. This may seem as if it is taking too seriously the idea of holding people responsible for their full utility functions.

Two points need to be made in reply here. The first is that one must focus clearly on the fact that by assumption the significant benefits that are being denied come from unauthorized welfare. When one vividly fleshes out the details of the envious, malicious, racist, or sexist sources (or whatever else they may be) of the denied welfare, it will become much less clear that it is wrong to deny this unauthorized welfare so as to promote the authorized welfare of others. The second point is that cases in which the only way to promote significantly the unauthorized welfare of many at the expense of the authorized welfare of a few are very strange cases. For they are cases in which it is impossible to compensate the few so they are not disadvantaged by promoting the unauthorized welfare of the many. In real life such compensation is almost always possible, so we must be very cautious in making judgements about what is permissible in the extreme cases.¹⁸

In any case, even if No Worsening does have some counter-intuitive

implications, that does not refute No Worsening. As is well known, every moral theory has counter-intuitive implications. Taking unauthorized utility at face value, for example, also yields counter-intuitive implications: under appropriate conditions it will yield the judgement that it is morally obligatory to sacrifice the welfare of others for that of a sadist or of a utility monster. Likewise, totally ignoring unauthorized utility also has counter-intuitive implications: under appropriate conditions it will yield the judgement that an option that is bad for everyone's full welfare is morally obligatory.

No Worsening may have some counter-intuitive implications, but so does every alternative to it. The question, then, is which approach is most adequate overall. No Worsening, I claim, is at least as plausible to the known alternatives. Perhaps there is a more plausible way of requiring sensitivity both to full welfare and to reconstructed welfare, but no such alternative has yet been developed.¹⁹

d. Conditions of Adequacy from Social Choice Theory

An important test of the four conditions is their compatibility with other plausible conditions of adequacy -- most notably those that have been formulated in the social choice literature. The four conditions, it turns out, can require certain theories -- such as utilitarianism -- to violate two important social choice conditions: Amartya Sen's Conditions Alpha and Beta. Because of the technical nature of these conditions, I relegate discussion of this issue to an appendix. I there show how the four conditions can require the violation of each of Sen's conditions. I suggest, however, that Sen's conditions are of doubtful plausibility, and that therefore it is not clear that the required violation casts doubt on the four conditions.

7. Conclusion

We have been exploring the problem of unauthorized welfare for welfare-based

theories. We have considered a middle path between two extreme views. At one extreme one might hold that the existence of unauthorized welfare shows that the welfare-based approach must be abandoned. At the other extreme one might hold that there is no unauthorized welfare, or at least that it should not be treated any differently from authorized welfare. We have explored how a welfare-based theory can recognize and deal with unauthorized welfare.

The discussion has been neutral on the question of what makes some welfare unauthorized. We have simply assumed that each theory supplies some non-trivial welfare standard. Of course, the issue of what sort of welfare standard, and reconstruction procedure, is appropriate for welfare-based theories is an important one. Nonetheless, our concern has been only with how such standards and procedures -- once appropriately specified -- should be used by moral theories.

I have formulated four conditions of adequacy, and suggested that they are applicable to all welfare-based theories. For concreteness we have focussed on how the conditions apply to utilitarianism, but I have formulated the conditions in a general form applicable to all welfare-based theories. More cautiously, I would claim that the four conditions (or some modification thereof) are plausible for utilitarianism; I would conjecture that they are also plausible for a broad range of welfare-based theories; and I would offer for consideration the claim that they are plausible for all welfare-based theories. This last suggestion may, of course, be mistaken: it may be that no conditions of adequacy for dealing with unauthorized welfare are plausible for all welfare-based theories. Still, enough has been said, I hope, to show that further investigation is worthwhile.²⁰

APPENDIX

An important test of the four conditions is their compatibility with plausible conditions of adequacy from the social choice literature. One must be careful, however, for such conditions have been formulated on the implicit assumption that all welfare is authorized. Once unauthorized welfare is recognized, the weakest reformulation of these conditions will be as requirements that are conditional on utility functions being authorized. That is, the weakest reformulation will have the form 'If everyone's utility function is authorized, then'. The four conditions (which have no bite when all utility functions are authorized) are clearly compatible with any consistent set of such conditional conditions.

A slightly stronger way of reformulating standard social choice conditions is simply to duplicate whatever condition is imposed on full utility functions on reconstructed utility functions. Thus, for example, the traditional weak Pareto principle (which requires that an option be judged impermissible if it gives everyone less welfare than some other option) could be reformulated as requiring that an option be judged impermissible if it gives everyone less welfare and less reconstructed utility than some other option. Almost any consistent set of conditions can, I speculate, be so reformulated so as to be compatible with the four conditions.

Not all social choice conditions, however, have the form of requiring a certain (in)sensitivity to people's utility functions. Some simply require that the (im)permissibility of options not be affected in certain ways when the option set is enlarged or diminished. The two best-known such conditions are Condition Alpha and Condition Beta:

ALPHA: An option that is judged permissible relative a given option set should also be judged permissible from any subset of the given option set containing the option.

BETA: If two options are judged permissible relative a given option set, then they should be either (a) both judged permissible, or (b) both judged impermissible, from any superset of the given option set.

Unfortunately, the four conditions can force moral theories to violate these two conditions -- even if the theories satisfy them in their traditional form (e.,g. only taking full utility functions as input). To see this, let us apply utilitarianism -- which, in its traditional form, satisfies both Alpha and Beta -- to the following cases.

Option	Reconstructed Welfare				Full Welfare			
	Robert	Maria	Sue	Total	Robert	Maria	Sue	Total
x	60	60	60	180	0	0	0	0
y	60	40	30	130	30	10	0	40
z	40	40	70	150	0	0	30	30

Example 6

Without going into the details, we might suppose here that the options are distributions of money, that reconstructed welfare is sensitive only to (e.g., equal to) the person's own monetary allocation, and that people's full welfare is based solely on their relative monetary superiority over the worst off person. (For example, under x each person gets \$60 and that gives no one any full welfare; and under y Robert gets \$60, Maria gets \$40, and Sue gets \$30.)

In this choice situation x alone (with a reconstructed social utility of 180) would be judged permissible on the basis of reconstructed utility functions. The restricted option set is {x,y,z}, and y alone would be judged permissible on the basis of full utility functions. Consequently, Restricted Permissibility and Restricted Impermissibility require that y alone be judged

permissible.

Now consider what the four conditions require when utilitarianism is applied to the option set $\{y,z\}$ -- i.e., when we suppose that x is not an option. Relative to $\{y,z\}$ z alone (with a reconstructed social utility of 150) would be judged permissible on the basis of reconstructed utility functions. The restricted option set is $\{z\}$, since in terms of full welfare y makes Sue less well off than z . But y is the only option that would be judged permissible on the basis of people's full utility functions. Consequently, Conflict Resolution requires that z , and only z , be judged permissible.

Thus, y was judged permissible from $\{x,y,z\}$, but not from $\{y,z\}$, and that violates Condition Alpha (which requires that an option judged permissible relative to a given set, also be judged permissible when other options are eliminated). So, even though the traditional version of utilitarianism satisfies Alpha, the revised version does not.

The suggested revision of utilitarianism violates Alpha because the revision procedure places limits on how much the welfare of an individual can be sacrificed to promote the unauthorized welfare of others. The limit (namely, the lowest full welfare assigned by an option that would be judged permissible on the basis of reconstructed utility functions) is sensitive to what options are in the option set. Eliminating an option from the option set (e.g., x in the above example) can increase the minimum limit for an individual, and thereby require that an option that was formerly judged permissible (e.g., y in the above example) be judged impermissible.

The issue, then, is whether it is plausible to require (as Alpha does) that permissibility not be sensitive in the above sort of way to contextual features. It is far from clear that this is so. For the idea of placing a limit on the sacrifices that can be demanded of an individual is quite plausible (although of course not uncontroversial). And if limits are placed, it is surely plausible that the limits be context sensitive -- and not absolute. But, as we have just seen, such limits may well violate Alpha. So, Alpha is

not obviously a plausible condition.

As a further way of challenging the plausibility of Alpha, note that the revised version of utilitarianism is not alone in violating this requirement. David Gauthier's bargaining theory violates Alpha because it makes permissibility depend on what each agent's maximum possible gain is, and that depends on contextual features. Likewise many satisficing theories -- such as those that judge an option permissible just in case it is in the top 10% of the option set in terms of utility, or just in case its utility is at least as great as twice the utility of the worst option -- violate Alpha. Again, such theories make permissibility sensitive to contextual features of the choice situation.

It is at least arguable, then, that Alpha is not a plausible condition of adequacy. So the fact that the four conditions can require violating Alpha does not refute the four conditions.

The four conditions can also require violating Condition Beta. To see this, let us apply the revised version of utilitarianism to the following case:

Option	<u>Reconstructed Welfare</u>				<u>Full Welfare</u>			
	<u>Robert</u>	<u>Maria</u>	<u>Sue</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Robert</u>	<u>Maria</u>	<u>Sue</u>	<u>Total</u>
x	60	60	80	200	0	0	20	20
y	60	40	50	150	20	0	10	30
z	40	40	70	150	0	0	30	30

Example 7

Here, let us suppose again, all three people's full utility functions rank options on the basis of their relative monetary superiority over the worst off person, and so are unauthorized.

In this choice situation x (with a reconstructed social utility of 200), and only x, would be judged permissible on the basis of reconstructed utility functions. The restricted option set is {x,z}, and z but not x would be judged

permissible on the basis of full utility functions. Consequently, together Restricted Permissibility and Restricted Impermissibility require that z alone be judged permissible.

Now consider what the four conditions require when utilitarianism is applied to the option set $\{y,z\}$. For that option set both y and z (each with a reconstructed social utility of 150) would be judged permissible on the basis of reconstructed utility functions. The restricted option set is $\{y,z\}$, and both y and z would be judged permissible on the basis of people's full utility functions. Consequently, Restricted Permissibility requires that y and z both be judged permissible.

Thus, y and z were both judged permissible from $\{y,z\}$, but z , but not y , is judged permissible from $\{x,y,z\}$. That violates Condition Beta -- which requires that two options judged permissible from a given set have the same status (both permissible, or both impermissible) when some new alternative is added to the set. So, even though the traditional version of utilitarianism satisfies Beta, the revised version does not.

The suggested revision of utilitarianism violates Beta because the revision procedure places limits on how much the welfare of an individual can be sacrificed to promote the unauthorized welfare of others. The limit in a given choice situation can rule out exactly one of two options with the same total welfare (e.g., y in the above example), since one, but not the other, may push someone below their minimum welfare limit. Consequently, since the limit for a given individual can be raised by adding an option to the option set (e.g., by adding x above), adding an option can result in one -- but not a second -- option no longer being permissible.

The issue, then, is whether it is plausible to require (as Beta does) that permissibility not be sensitive in the above sort of way to contextual features. As in the case of Alpha, it is far from clear that this is so. For the idea of placing a limit on the sacrifices that can be demanded of an individual is quite plausible. And if limits are placed, it is surely plau-

sible that the limits be context sensitive -- and not absolute. Furthermore, the revised version of utilitarianism is not alone in violating Beta. The satisficing theories noted above also violate it.

It is at least arguable, then, that Beta is not a plausible condition of adequacy. So the fact that the four conditions can require the violation of Beta does not refute the four conditions.

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NOTES

1. General discussions of the problem of unauthorized welfare occur in: Section 4 of Mill (1859), Scanlon (1975), Sen (1985a, 1985b). The problem has been discussed in the context of utilitarian theory in: Section 3 of Smart (1973), and in Section 8 of Harsanyi (1977). The problem has been discussed in the context of egalitarian theory (broadly construed) in: Rawls (1971 [sec. 6], 1982), Sen (1980), Dworkin (1981), Roemer (1985, 1986a, 1986b), Arneson (1989), and Cohen (1989). The problem has been discussed (with specific reference to meddlesome preferences) in the context of Amartya Sen's impossibility of a Paretian liberal result in, for example, Sen (1976), Farrell (1976), and Goodin (1986).

2. Welfare-based theories need not be welfarist in the sense of assessing the permissibility of options solely on the basis of welfare considerations. An example of a theory that is welfare-based, but not welfarist is a theory that judges options permissible if and only if (1) they do not violate anyone's rights, and (2) relative to those options that do not violate anyone's rights they maximize social utility.

3. Of course, in many cases promoting unauthorized welfare (e.g., that derived from sadism) will be bad for full social welfare in the long run (e.g., because it encourages sadism). But this is not always so. Example 1 is an (artificial) example where full social welfare is best promoted by promoting unauthorized welfare. The example is intended to motivate the claim that the promotion of unauthorized welfare should not be treated on par with the promotion of authorized welfare.

4. Almost all the authors cited in Note 2 make roughly this inference. The exceptions are: Smart (1973), who bites the bullet and insists that only full welfare is to be counted; and Cohen (1989) and Sen (1980, 1985a, 1985b) who allow (as I will) that full welfare promotion is relevant, but insist that its role is restricted by resource allocation considerations (more on this below).

5. This claim rests on the assumption that it is wrong to deny a benefit to someone when it would impose no costs on anyone. Will Kymlicka has pointed out that in at least some cases one could argue that, although it would be nice to give a benefit to someone (e.g., loaning him/her your car), the other person has no claim to that benefit, and so there is nothing wrong with refusing to give it. This is certainly true in a wide range of cases, but not, I claim, when giving the benefit would be costless. We at least have an obligation to help when it imposes no sacrifice on anyone. This assumption, of course, is not uncontroversial.

6.It is denied by all the authors cited in Note 2 except Smart (1973).

7.I owe this suggestion to Alisa Carse.

8.It may be that not all utility functions that rank options in the same order represent a person's welfare disposition. If the disposition is cardinal in units (having welfare unit intensity as well as order) only utility functions that assign the same relative utility differences (i.e., that agree on whether $U(x)-U(y)$ is greater than, or equal to, $U(z)-U(w)$) represent the disposition. Only if people's welfare dispositions have both an intrinsic zero and an intrinsic unit (which is a very strong assumption) is there a unique utility function representing their welfare disposition. For brevity, however, I shall write as if there is a unique utility function representing a person's welfare disposition. This fiction is harmless, because we shall be appealing only to features of utility functions that represent a person's welfare disposition, and thus only to features that are shared by all utility functions representing that disposition. In particular, welfare standards (introduced below) will appeal (at least so we shall assume) only to properties of a person's welfare disposition -- and not to accidental features of any particular utility function.

9.I assume, however, that if preference satisfaction is the conception of welfare it is the satisfaction of fundamental (i.e., belief independent) preferences that is relevant. Thus, full welfare so conceived is not affected by false beliefs.

10.No Worsening conjoined with the assumption that at least one option of any given option set is permissible entails that being judged permissible on the basis of people's full utility functions is not necessary for being judged permissible. Example 3 illustrates this.

11.In the text I discuss only unauthorized intensity of welfare based on interpersonal comparisons of utility. Problems of unauthorized intensity of welfare can arise even when no interpersonal comparisons are made. For example, if the welfare standard recognizes only utility functions that are strictly linear in money, and $U(\$50)=50$, $U(\$60)=60$, and $U(\$70)=65$, then U is unauthorized welfare independent of any interpersonal comparisons. For if \$60 gives 10 more units of utility than \$50, then the utility function is authorized only if \$70 gives 10 more units of utility than \$60 (which it doesn't).

12. Whereas utilitarianism requires only that utility units be interpersonally comparable, welfare egalitarianism also requires that utility zeros be interpersonally comparable. Consequently there is another type of utility monster that causes problems for welfare egalitarianism. A handicap utility monster is someone who requires an excessive amount of resources in order to reach his/her utility zero point (e.g., a trillion dollars where "normal" people would only require \$1,000). Handicap utility monsters create problems of welfare egalitarianism because welfare equalization requires that they be given inordinate amounts of resources.

13. Since reconstructed utility functions are always constructed so as to be authorized, objective reconstruction procedures can accompany only objective welfare standards (as defined in Section 0).

14. Both Rawls (1971, 1982) and Dworkin (1981) defend the plausibility of basing moral permissibility on non-subjective measures of value.

15. Mill (1859) and Harsanyi (1977) assume something like this procedure, and Farrell (1976) and Goodin (1986) suggest concrete procedures. Following Goodin we can call such procedures 'laundrying procedures'. Laundrying procedures are thus but one type of reconstruction procedure. An especially promising way of laundrying preferences is to take them to be the agent's preferences over equivalence classes of alternatives -- where the equivalence classes are sets of alternatives that are the same with respect to certain specified features (e.g., the agent's own resource allocation). Such an approach yields preferences that are insensitive to what are specified to be irrelevant features (i.e., those features which do not define the equivalence classes).

16. Note also that we can, and should, relax the assumption that each theory specifies a reconstruction procedure that, for a given scale, selects a unique utility function. For, like almost anything else, reconstruction procedures are at least somewhat vague. To deal adequately with vagueness one would have to do something like recognizing families of (precise) reconstruction procedures, and then using supervvaluations to identify clear cases of permissibility (permissible relative to all recognized reconstruction procedures), clear cases of impermissibility (permissible relative to none of the recognized reconstruction procedures), and indeterminate cases (permissible relative to some, but not all, recognized reconstruction procedures). This sort of treatment is needed for both for ordinal and cardinal

welfare standards. For simplicity, however, I ignore the problems of vagueness (which are in no way specific to authorization standards!).

17.Cohen (1989) very persuasively argues that how one takes into consideration a person's welfare (if at all) in a particular case should depend on whether he/she is responsible -- because of a previous choice -- for his/her welfare sensitivities relevant to that case.

18.I am indebted to Will Kymlicka for both these points.

19.One possibility that I have not explored is that of assigning to each person a "combination" utility function, which is defined as a weighted average (e.g., 50%-50%) of his/her full utility function and his/her reconstructed utility function. This does not seem very promising.

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